The Nature of Economic System and Preventive Surveillance: Ratiometric in the Prevention of economic crimes in Iran

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Corresponding Author, PhD student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Islamic Azad University South Tehran Branch

2 Assistant Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Farabi Campus of the University of Tehran

Abstract

Surveillance of economic activities is considered an important solution for preventing corruption and economic crimes. Its efficiency depends greatly on the nature of the economic system. When it comes to a specific economic system, traditional approaches may be inefficient to prevent economic crimes. Now, the present research sought to investigate the potential link between surveillance as a preventive solution and the nature of Iran's economic system. The type and structure of Iran's economic system is a serious obstacle to the efficiency of preventive monitoring. This situation with the increased number of monitoring entities and methods has created a condition based on extensive overlap between regulatory measures, the rise in corruption in monitoring, provisional security, and changes in the opportunities to commit a crime. Being separated from the international economy, Iran's economic system cannot follow cross-border principles. So, a monitoring approach focused on an independent entity is required until it becomes In line with the global economy.
 
1.Introduction
Surveillance of economic activities is one of the most substantial tools that prevent economic crimes. If economic actors' behaviors are monitored, it will be possible to detect diversions timely. By doing so, supervision ensures sound economic activities but also alleviates the economic crimes rate by increasing the cost of crime commitment. Confrontation with economic crimes within preventive measures is based on the issues that depend on the type of economic and political system. Dealing with the criminal phenomenon will be a collective and sub-collective if it is subject to various factors, including culture, economy, type of political system, and social requirements. The collective aspect of the criminal phenomenon is highlighted when behavior blaming possibility and criminal enforcement sanctions are based on the society's expediency or political power rather than ethical and religious fundamentals. The sub-collective or subsidiary aspect of a criminal phenomenon is revealed if the phenomenon is not an original title in violation of criminal law and enters the criminal system from other areas. Economic crimes are the second category. Hence, measures taken to prevent economic crimes will fail if adopted without considering the specifications of economic structure. Economic crimes rates have always been increasing in Iran. It means that preventive supervision, which is the most important conditional preventive measure for economic crimes, does not have acceptable outcomes. The extant study aims to find how the nature of the economic system in Iran can influence the relativity of crime-preventing measures.
 
2.Methodology
This study used bibliographic references and a descriptive method with a structural approach to finding the relationship between the nature of Iran's economic system and the performance of preventive surveillance measures.
 
3.Results and discussion
Measures that prevent economic crimes and corruption are presented based on UN organizations or other transnational organizations to apply such measures uniformly and seamlessly. This approach converts preventive actions to sanctions beyond the cultural, political, and social musts, making them subject to the nature of the economy, which has a global face. Hence, global models for preventing this phenomenon are effective national solutions. On the other hand, the economy's nature is based on the national and inland characteristics, especially in countries that do not obey the market economy or are far away from the main systems of economy. Such economies cannot follow global models designed to prevent crimes because they have different requirements and contexts. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the properties of Iran's economic system to the achieved objective of the present study.
 
4.Conclusion
Private property has been recognized in Iran's Constitution, but there are different viewpoints about the case in question due to the imbalance of private property scope in confrontation with public property and lack of transparency in attitude towards the economy. The variety of viewpoints makes it difficult to detect Iran's type of economic system. However, it is clear historical developments in Iran's economy, either before or after Islamic Revolution, have made governments follow maximum interference policies with different motivations. This may stem from centralism ruling policies of Islamic countries. According to historical background and reports published by international institutions, Iran's economic system is a unfree or repressed economic system. In Iran, maximum interference of government in all economic sectors and the role of supervision as a single governance case have led to the dysfunction of the surveillance system. The reason is that this system is influenced by the governance approach to the economy, considering it as a dependent and security system, which is based on taste and expediency. The economy is a global phenomenon, so surveillance of economic activities must be done based on the international models. It is impossible to follow international models due to Iran's withdrawal from world economic relations. Therefore, the fundamental solution includes improving the surveillance system, revising the economic structure, and following the economic globalization process. The first step to do this is the legal prohibition of the government's action in the economy by the Constitution. Such structural correction in the Constitution makes the government reduce its presence in economic activities but do its mission, including supervision and support. To do this, management of the surveillance system over economic activities must be assigned to a fully independent surveillance organization. In this case, surveillance organizations can apply preventive monitoring measures in economic activities of public and private sectors under the support of law without any specific prohibition concerning certain institutions.
 
5.Selection of References
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