مطالعه نظری نقش احساسات و عواطف در تصمیم‌گیری‌های قضایی؛ با تکیه بر رویکرد تصمیم‌گیری دو روشی

Like other human beings, judges can be unknowingly influenced by feeling and emotions. This article tries to identify and explain how such limitations can affect judicial decisions. Benefiting from library tools and using the results of experimental studies carried out in other countries, the paper reveals that judicial decision-making is not a merely mechanical process formed based on the contents of the case and the compliance of the matter with the laws. Rather, the feelings, emotions, and other cognitive limitations of the judge's mind may incorporate into judicial decisions through the influence of Method I (intuitive and cognitive perception) and subconsciously through Method II (reflective and reasoning perception) and consciously. Therefore, aimed at minimizing the influence and impact of these errors and biases in litigation processes, we have to purify the minds of judges from such biases and perceptual mistakes by informing judicial authorities about the nature and mechanism of action of these cognitive limitations.
 
1.Introduction
People usually make judgments by recalling instances of internal and external actions; that is, independent subjective parts, and by adding the results of the recalled instances or adjusting them. Several sociologists believe that the sociological analysis of individual actions includes a cognitive aspect. However, other judgments made by people require complex causal arguments such as judgment about the guilt or innocence of the accused in criminal issues. Like other people, judges take advantage of their cognition of society and the expectations of the community to find the meanings of rationality and normality of behaviors, urgency, value and validity of witnesses, and so forth. Although intuitive and cognitive understanding of judges cannot be neglected in judicial decisions and is considered the driving force of judicial procedures, ideal legal presumptions may be unconsciously affected and distorted by cognitive limitations while making judicial decisions. There may even be a conflict between logic and justice, resulting in illogical actions. It should be noted that the nature of judicial decisions has been attracted by lawyers and scholars of the realism movement in law since the late 19^th century. Legal realism has been identified as the reaction of the practitioners and experts in the judicial system against legal formalism or mechanical judicial procedure that focuses on rational mechanisms and law. As stated by legal realists, judgment is made according to realities in the case, not legal rules and reasons.
 
2.Methodology
This is a descriptive-analytical study and physical written sources such as Persian and English books and papers and the findings of experimental studies reported by scholars in other countries were used to collect data. The instrument of the study was note-taking from the library documents, and the prepared notes were evaluated and investigated to conclude the data.
 
3.Results and Discussion
This study used presumptions of the realistic approach to the law while rejecting the mechanical notion of the judicial decision-making process to examine the adoption of these decisions rather than a mechanical process as a human activity that suffers from cognitive limitations and errors and analyze the role of mental filters in the judicial decision-making process. Then, it employed the teachings of the dual decision-making model of Daniel Kahneman, a cognitive psychologist who won the Nobel Prize in 2002, to determine the effect of emotion on judicial decisions. This model accepts the unconscious presence and occurrence of information of intuitive understanding in the decision-making process based on system 1 and emphasizes conscious filtration of this information in interaction with system 2 of decision-making, which is based on logical, regular, and reflective thinking and careful examination of the issue by judges. The theoretical findings of the paper indicated that feelings, emotions, and other cognitive limitations of the judges’ minds may affect judicial decisions by the effect of system 1 (intuitive and cognitive understanding) and the unconscious on system 2 (reflective and argumentative understanding) and consciousness. Therefore, it was concluded that the judges' minds must be filtered from biases and perceptual errors by notifying the consequences of cognitive limitations to minimize the effect of such biases and errors in judicial procedures.
 
4.Conclusions
Hence, it is suggested to see initially our reality and pay attention to our brain to make more reasonable decisions. Moreover, people must honestly assess their faults, talents, strengths, and weaknesses and use their knowledge and cognition to exhibit the complex structure of the brain that shapes their behaviors. Accordingly, the realism movement in law has taken actions to demonstrate the model inaccuracy and estimate appropriate decision-making by the judges by proposing the notion that judges' decisions are not simply neutral and mechanical actions containing personal, moral, social, and even political options.
 
5.Selection of References
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