University of Guilan (with the participation of the Iranian Association of Penal Law) Criminal Law Research 2322-2328 10 2 2020 01 21 The Position of Judge’s Knowledge in Proving Criminal Matters in Iranian Law The Position of Judge’s Knowledge in Proving Criminal Matters in Iranian Law 165 186 3889 10.22124/jol.2019.5424.1225 FA Kyoumars Kalantari Prof. of Criminal Law and Criminology, Mazandaran University Abbas Salmanpour Assistant Prof. Department of Law. University of Guilan. 0000-0003-3745-5597 Journal Article 2016 09 26 One of the most important topics with a significant effect on the manifestation of legal justice is a matter regarding proving grounds, which the sentence legislator is required to explain with more clarity. The Islamic punishment law, approved in 1392 (2013) considers these grounds to be confession, witnessing, oath, vows, and judge’s knowledge.  As we know, among proving grounds, confessions have special standing to the extent that it is called the “queen” of legal reasons, such that as soon as there is a confession, the judge is required to issue his verdict based on it.  In the present article, considering the Islamic punishment law of 1392 (2013) we attempt to determine the position of the judge’s knowledge in proving criminal matters, and whether we can consider it the “higher reason” or the “queen” of reasons.  Is there a reason that has a higher position among criminal proving grounds?  The results of the analyses indicate that for the first time, in the Islamic punishment law of 1392 (2013), while keeping the proof value of the other grounds, the legislator has considered judge’s knowledge in a higher position than the other criminal grounds including confession and witnessing. One of the most important topics with a significant effect on the manifestation of legal justice is a matter regarding proving grounds, which the sentence legislator is required to explain with more clarity. The Islamic punishment law, approved in 1392 (2013) considers these grounds to be confession, witnessing, oath, vows, and judge’s knowledge.  As we know, among proving grounds, confessions have special standing to the extent that it is called the “queen” of legal reasons, such that as soon as there is a confession, the judge is required to issue his verdict based on it.  In the present article, considering the Islamic punishment law of 1392 (2013) we attempt to determine the position of the judge’s knowledge in proving criminal matters, and whether we can consider it the “higher reason” or the “queen” of reasons.  Is there a reason that has a higher position among criminal proving grounds?  The results of the analyses indicate that for the first time, in the Islamic punishment law of 1392 (2013), while keeping the proof value of the other grounds, the legislator has considered judge’s knowledge in a higher position than the other criminal grounds including confession and witnessing. https://jol.guilan.ac.ir/article_3889_58f4a21ac5b3738c1d83c14032fda7cd.pdf